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Abstract – This work proposes a fuzzy multimodal technique capa-
ble of guaranteeing the desired level of security while keeping under
control the high costs typically associated to some biometric authen-
tication devices. Specifically we describe a fuzzy controller choosing
within a palette of authentication techniques to continuously check
and confirm its trust in the identity of a user.
I. INTRODUCTION
The effectiveness of access control systems rests on one im-
portant assumption, proper user identification [1]. This con-
dition has been traditionally guaranteed by authentication en-
gines checking the user’s credentials before granting access
to a computer system. For our purposes, authentication tech-
niques can be divided into two main classes: weak and strong
authentication methods.
• Weak authentication methods include traditional crypto-
systems that do not identify the user as such. The authen-
tication is based on knowledge, such as a password, or
on a token, such as a key, magnetic or chip card. The
basic problem is that passwords can often be guessed
or searched by an attacker and a long, randomly chang-
ing password is difficult to remember. For this reason
smart cards have been introduced which include tamper-
resistant packaging and special hardware that disables the
card if it is tampered with or if the number of failed au-
thentication attempts exceeds a chosen threshold. Unfor-
tunately, these devices can be lost, stolen, forgotten or dis-
closed.
• Strong authentication methods have been developed to ad-
dress drawbacks of traditional techniques. They include
biometric systems (also called ID-based authenticators)
answering the question: “Who are you?”. Common phys-
ical biometrics include fingerprints, hand or palm geom-
etry and retina, iris or facial characteristics. Behavioral
features include signature, voice (which has also a phys-
ical component), keystroke pattern and gait. Biometric
characteristics are essentially permanent and unchange-
able and users cannot pass them to other users as easily as
they do with cards or passwords. Furthermore these tech-
niques are based on features that cannot be lost or forgot-
ten. A biometric authentication system is also fast. The
authentication of an user in a fingerprint reader system
can take under two seconds, whereas finding a key ring,
locating the right key and using it can take as long as ten
seconds.
Some issues related to strong authentication methods are still
unsolved. In some cases, if the input sample quality is not
sufficient for further processing, the system must reacquire
data, and the resulting system might be more complicated or
more expensive. Furthermore some biometric sensors, partic-
ularly those having contact with users, have a limited lifetime.
In highly sensitive environments, such as military facilities, it
may be necessary to perform strong authentication many times
(e.g., at random intervals) to prevent identity substitution af-
ter the initial authentication step. In such a scenario, the au-
thentication system must distinguish between the initial step,
in which it uses strong authentication to identify the user, and
the following authentication steps in which the system decides
if its trust in user’s identity is high enough to allow the user to
continue to perform the activity she is doing. Multi-modal bio-
metric systems integrate multiple authentication techniques.
Multi-modality will be important for many security applica-
tions, including checking the digital passports of the future,
incorporating biometric data that will be probably different
from country to country1. In this paper, we propose a multi-
modal authentication system that combines face authentica-
tion known for its acceptability with conventional password-
based techniques providing high accuracy. In our approach,
different trust levels are set for different methods of authenti-
cation. When a user gains access to a protected facility, our
system continuously checks whether the users’ authentication
data can be trusted, e.g. enough to satisfy the required security
clearance level. If trust is sufficiently high, no action is taken.
When trust gets too low, the system chooses a suitable authen-
tication technique, gets the corresponding biometric data, and
decides whether the new information satisfies the required se-
curity level. In this way, users are kept under a continuous
authentication process and security clearance levels can be rig-
orously maintained. The paper is organized as follows: Sect.II
contains a brief description of advantages and disadvantages
of the main authentication techniques available today, Sect.III
details and motivates the choices made in terms of adopted
1 While a portrait image will remain a shared element of passports around
the world, the U.S. adopted fingerprint data while the European Union may
still opt for iris data for its passports.
technologies and system architecture, Sect.IV briefly reviews
Mamdami and Takagi-Sugeno-Kang inference methodologies
and motivates the approach adopted in our system, Sect.V de-
scribes the architecture of the fuzzy based system used to con-
tinuously check the identity of the user, Sect.VI reviews the
prototype simulation data and describes the most important re-
sults obtained and, finally, Sect.VII reports the conclusions and
outlines some future work.
A. Related Work
In the last few years, there has been increasing awareness
that multi-modal authentication (i.e., techniques more than one
form of credential to identify a user) is generally stronger than
any single-mode authentication method. In multi-modal sys-
tems “redundancy” is used to tolerate possible failures of au-
thentication devices, including those due to users anomalies
(e.g., eye diseases which may prevent iris recognition systems
from capturing an appropriate image of the user’s eye, or skin
diseases which may prevent fingerprint acquisition). In this
context, the multi-modal approach was originally introduced
in order to alleviate the drawbacks of each individual tech-
nique. The work [10] presents a multi-biometric verification
system that combines speaker verification, fingerprint verifica-
tion with face identification. The authors use a fuzzy decision
support system in order to take into account the external con-
ditions that can affect verification performances. They show
how the fusion of the three techniques reduces the error rates
of 48% w.r.t. the speaker verification alone. Another interest-
ing work is [11] that improves security by using typing bio-
metric to reinforce password authentication mechanism. Also
this methodology employs fuzzy logic to measure the user’s
typing biometrics. About face recognition, [13] presents a face
template matching algorithm based on a 3D head model cre-
ated from a single frontal face image. In this way the match-
ing is robust across variations in pose, expression and illumi-
nations conditions. This work was extended in [14] where
authors describe a method for tracking a face on a video se-
quence, by recovering the full-motion and the expression de-
formation of the face using 3D expressive facial model. From
some characteristic face points given on the first frame, an ap-
proximated 3D model of the face is re-constructed. Using a
steepest descent image approach, the algorithm is able to ex-
tract simultaneously the parameters related to the face expres-
sion and to the 3D posture. Industrial researchers at Hitachi
(http://www.sdl.hitachi.co.jp) developed a fully-
fledged multi-modal system capable of choosing the “right”
authentication technique depending on the required security
clearance level. However, to the best of our knowledge [12]
is the first paper where multi-modality is applied to the prob-
lem of checking continuously user identity during a working
session to avoid malicious behavior such as identity substitu-
tion.
TABLE I
BASIC USER AUTHENTICATION ATTRIBUTES.
Attributes User Authentication
Knowledge Based Token Based ID based
Identification Password, Secret Token Biometric
Supports Secrecy or obscurity Possession Uniqueness and
personalization
Security De-
fence
Closely kept Closely held Forge resistant
Security
Drawback
Less secret Lost, stolen Difficult to replace
Examples Combinational lock,
password
Metal key,
smart card
Fingerprint, face
II. ADVANTAGES AND DRAWBACKS OF
AUTHENTICATION TECHNIQUES
Different authentication techniques may be appropriate for
different applications, depending on perceived user profiles,
the need to interface with other systems or database, environ-
mental conditions, and other application specific parameters.
Attributes of three categories of user authentication methods
are compared in Table I.
The work [4] carried out a detailed comparison of authen-
tication technologies, discussing potential attacks against each
technique. Some issues related to defenses are listed below:
• Knowledge-based techniques, thanks to challenge-
response password protocols, have proved robust against
replay and transmission attacks. However, these tech-
niques do not support compromise detection and do not
offer much defense against repudiation.
• Token-based techniques provide for compromise detec-
tion and add protection against denial-of-service attacks.
The twomain shortcomings of token-based techniques are
high cost, and vulnerability to theft. Token validation re-
quires equipment whose cost is comparable to the one of
(much more secure) biometric systems.
• Biometrics data are less easily lent or stolen than oth-
ers. For this reason, biometric systems provide a much
stronger defense against repudiation. Problems include
limited lifetime of particular biometrics, and possible vi-
olations of the user privacy.
III. CHOOSING MODALITIES
First of all, we must inquire which authentication devices
commercially available can be used in our context. Since our
system needs to continuously check the identity of the user
while she is working, we want it to be the least intrusive as
possible. Hence we will not consider devices such as retina,
iris or voice recognition systems, because they would require
the user to interrupt her activity for a while during the biomet-
ric acquisition process. Fingerprint, hand geometry and face
recognition express matching between the acquisition and the
stored template by a number n ∈ [0, 1] that indicates the nor-
malized number of features that perfectly match the template.
This value is a suitable input for a fuzzy controller. In this
paper, we will not deal with fingerprint and hand geometry be-
cause these techniques require devices having a limited life-
time. More importantly, they hardly guarantee that the person
who provides biometric data is the same that was authenticated
originally. For example, suppose that university students sit
their exams using a computer application without faculty su-
pervision. In such a scenario, identity substitution could eas-
ily be performed after authentication, with the consent of the
authenticated user, even if the authentication system keeps on
requesting fingerprints. The original user could just stay avail-
able to provide fingerprints when required, while another stu-
dent works on the examination paper. On the other hand, in
the case of face recognition a digital camera can be installed
on the top of the computer display, pointing in the direction
of the user. The user does not know if the entire session is
recorded or if the camera is used only for an automatic authen-
tication, therefore malicious behavior is less likely. Of course,
face recognition suffers of other drawbacks such as inconsis-
tent presentation (i.e. different acquisitions may represent dif-
ferent poses of a face), irreproducible presentation (e.g. due to
facial hair growth, a broken nose or wearing eyeglasses) and
imperfect signal/representation acquisition (e.g. due to differ-
ent illuminations). However it has been experimentally tested
[4] that face recognition is affected by a experimentally de-
termined FNMR (False NonMatch Rate) of 16% and a FMR
(False Match Rate) = 16%. In our context these values can
be decidedly reduced just by asking the user to check the il-
lumination conditions of the room where she is working. In
this paper, we shall use face recognition as our first (Strong)
modality and standard UserId/Password authentication as our
second (Weak) modality. Specifically, when the user tries to lo-
gin, she initially inserts her UserId and Password. As we shall
see, UserId will be used to select the template to which the
system will try to match the face acquisition.
IV. A FUZZY APPROACH TO MULTI-MODALITY
We are now ready to discuss which inference technique best
fits our requirements. In this section we discuss applicability
to multi-modality of two inference methodologies: Mamdami
(MA) [5] and Takagi-Sugeno-Kang (TSK) [6]. A MA type
fuzzy rule has the form IF x1 ISA
j
1 AND x2 ISA
j
2 . . .AND xn
IS Ajn THEN y IS Bj with j ∈ [1,M ], where xi, i = 1 . . . N ,
are linguistic input variables (e.g. temperature), Aji are input
fuzzy sets (e.g., “medium”, “high”) while y is the linguistic
output variable (e.g., trustworthiness), Bj is the output fuzzy
set andM is the number of fuzzy rules.
In a MA type inference rule the consequent of each rule is
also composed of fuzzy sets which are represented as linguistic
variables. For each firing fuzzy rule the output of the rule infer-
ence (implication) will be mapped to its corresponding output
fuzzy set, i.e., the result is described in terms of membership
in fuzzy sets. Finally, in order to compute a crisp output value,
a process called defuzzification must be applied. Popular de-
fuzzification techniques include center of area, center of max-
ima and mean of maxima (see [7] for a review). In the TSK
fuzzy inference method, the antecedent block of each fuzzy
rule remains the same as in the previous approach, but the con-
sequent employs a simple equation which takes input variables
into account. Fuzzy inference systems can also be modeled
using fuzzy rules with singleton consequents. However ([8]),
limited modeling capabilities of singleton type FIS result in
more coarse grained results and thus affect the quality of the
model. When applied to trust-based decision support systems
[8], MA is a more intuitive approach since the output is mod-
eled using linguistic variables rather than linear or quadratic
equations. However, when using linguistic variables within the
consequent block of fuzzy rules it becomes necessary to per-
form additional calculations in order to generate a crisp output.
In this case, defuzzification requires more computational re-
sources and can thus result in slower performance compared to
TSK. This is especially true when the fuzzy inference engine
contains a large set of rules. Furthermore, MA offers the flex-
ibility of choosing the defuzzification method more suitable to
the specific application. Finally, MA fuzzy inference engine is
more suitable for analytic applications [8] where the decision
process must be human-understandable and it is not necessary
to process a large amount of data.
A. A Fuzzy Controller for Multi-modal Authentication
We developed a fuzzy controller computing an output vari-
able expressing trust in the user identification. Trust is well-
expressed as a linguistic variable. Our controller follows the
Mamdani approach with a center of area defuzzification. Ex-
perimental results confirm the goodness of our choice (see
Sect. VI). The controller’s operation is described in detail
in Sect. V. Briefly, we suppose that, after the initial authen-
tication in which the password is used to limit the biometric
FNMR and FMR, trust in user identity is computed on the ba-
sis of i) biometric matching score and ii) password check (ac-
cept/reject). If the password is correct and the biometric score
is higher than a pre-set threshold, the session starts with a cer-
tain trust value. Then, biometric and password trustworthiness
start to decay and, after a certain time, a new trust value is
computed. On the basis of this value the system may decide to
close the session altogether, continue the session without ask-
ing for a new authentication or asking the user to authenticate
again. If a new authentication is asked, a new trust value is
computed and the session goes on. This cycle ends when the
session is closed by the system, or ended by the user.
V. ARCHITECTURE OF THE FUZZY SYSTEM
Our approach includes a trust evaluation process which con-
tinuously checks the identity of the user who is performing a
certain activity. Figure 1 shows the basic steps of our process:
after an initial authentication, the server can require further au-
thentication steps based on two parameters 1) the level of trust
previously computed and 2) the time passed from the last au-
thentication. We suppose the first authentication to have been
performed using both techniques. Indeed the userID is used to
choose in the database the template to be used in the matching
of the biometric acquisitions, because in a matching one-to-one
user computer
server
Authentication
user2 computer2
Identificationdata
Identificatio
n
data Trust rules
Request of authentication renewal/
authentication refused
Request of authentication renewal/
authentication refused
Digital
camera
Digital
camera
Fig. 1. Context for trust evaluation model
the error rates are significantly reduced. The following steps,
instead, can be acquired by strong or weak techniques on the
basis of the trust level.
A. Trust Evaluation Parameters
In our model each user authentication can be performed us-
ing strong or weak authentication techniques. The BIO value
represents how the biometric enrollment matches the user’s
template. In this approach BIO corresponds to the acceptance
rate resulting from the matching phase of the face authentica-
tion process, normalized in the range [0, 1]. The second authen-
tication parameter, TOK, corresponds to the boolean output
(low/high) of the weak authentication system which supports
the evaluation of the trust in the user’s identity during the ac-
tivity. In our prototype we used a UserId/password system. At
the initial authentication step, the weak technique is involved
to enforce the biometric acquisition and the parameter TOK,
if the authentication successes, is set to high, i.e. equal to 1.
Two aging parameters, respectively for the biometric and the
token parameter values, are defined in order to measure how
the system’s trust in the identity of the user decays in time,
by considering separately two straight lines for BIO and for
TOK. The curves are shown in equations 1 and 2, where the
valuesMbio andMtok represent respectively, the gradient that
describes the measurement of the grade of the corresponding
straight line; in this approach the gradient is obviously set to
negative values, since the function has to be time-linearly de-
creasing. Timeline corresponds to the x-axis of the timeli-
ness function, that shows the time t computed as n ∗∆ where
n = [1,∞] is the number of trust evaluations performed by
the system and ∆ is the time interval between two consecutive
trust evaluations. Its maximum value corresponds to the overall
session duration. Finally, BIOmax and TOKmax represent,
respectively, the initial values obtained at the initial authentica-
tion at time t0. Then, when time is equal to 0, theBIOmax and
TOKmax are equal to BIO and TOK values resulting from the
weak and the biometric authentication systems. At run time,
BIO and TOK will be set to the values of aging corresponding
to the elapsed time t.
BIOCurve =Mbio ∗ timeline+BIOmax (1)
TOKCurve =Mtok ∗ timeline+ TOKmax (2)
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Fig. 2. Architecture of the Multi-modal Fuzzy Trust Model.
B. Fuzzy Controller Operation
The entire process implemented in our approach is shown
in Figure 2.
At the first step, the information obtained by the biometric
engine, i.e. the value BIO, and the parameter TOK are fed into
a fuzzy inference engine Fuzzy Trust Model in order to calcu-
late a trust value TRUST that expresses the level of trust of the
system in the user’s identity after the initial authentication at
time t0. Of course, prior to processing of the inputs, it is nec-
essary to define fuzzy membership functions which define the
degree of membership of each input parameter in the context
of the proposed model. Also, it is necessary to define the con-
troller’s fuzzy rules. We shall deal with these aspects in the
next section.
At time t0 BIO and TOK are initialized; at each time ti
(i > 0), the decay rate of these values will depend on the corre-
sponding aging parameters. The TRUST value is then defuzzi-
fied through a Defuzzifier engine, using the standard centroid-
of-area technique. The output is then fed to another fuzzy en-
gine, Fuzzy DSSModel, to compute the final level of trust. This
second engine takes as inputs, together with the trust defuzzi-
fied value, also external conditions, that may become useful
in such a multi-modal authentication approach, that consider
biometric authentication techniques. Acceptance rate may de-
grade when the lighting is too bright or too dark, or when the
input facial image for matching is posed at an angle or carries
an expression that differs from the enrollment images. In Table
II these context variables are generally named CONTEXT and
supposed, for simplicity, with possible fuzzy values “good”
and “poor”. The label ALERT represents an alert message that
is displayed on the user’s video asking the user to set the light-
ing conditions of the room before going on with the new au-
thentication acquisition. The resulting trust of the Fuzzy DSS
Model is defuzzified again with the standard centroid-of-area
technique, and the output value is compared with the threshold
of the membership functions of the Fuzzy DSS Model at each
time ti.
If the output trust is low the system asks for trust enforce-
ment by going through the Matching phase. In this case the
system asks for a user re-authentication, that can be biometric
TABLE II
SAMPLE FUZZY RULES DEFINED FOR EACH TRUST MODEL.
Model Fuzzy Rules
Start
Trust
IF BIO is high AND TOK is high THEN TRUST is high
Model IF BIO is high AND TOK is low THEN TRUST is low
IF BIO is medium AND TOK is high THEN TRUST is
medium
IF BIO is medium AND TOK is low THEN TRUST is low
IF BIO is low AND TOK is high THEN TRUST is low
IF BIO is low AND TOK is low THEN TRUST is very low
Fuzzy
DSS
IF TRUST is very low THEN Close User Working Session
Model IF TRUST is low AND CONTEXT is good THEN Match-
ing: New BIO/TOK
IF TRUST is low AND CONTEXT is poor THEN ALERT
ANDMatching: New BIO/TOK
IF TRUST is medium THEN Time Controller
IF TRUST is high THEN Time Controller
or knowledge-based, depending on the BIO and TOK values at
that time ti. In particular, the system re-acquires the parameter
whose value at time ti is less than a corresponding minimum
threshold, previously defined, while maintains the same value
at time ti if it is more than the corresponding threshold. If the
trust output is considered medium or high the system checks,
through the Time Controller module, how the trust acquired at
time ti has been affected by the decay rate of the BIO and TOK
authentication timeless functions, giving the new, decreased,
parameter values for BIO and TOK at time ti+1. These values
are fed into the Fuzzy Trust Model in order to obtain the new
trust value at time ti+1.
When the trust level decays to the value of very low, the user
inserts two wrong passwords in the same weak authentication
step, or when the maximum value of the examination time is
reached, the execution step goes to the Close User Working
Session and the process stops.
C. Trust Model Rules
Each of the two fuzzy models presented in the previous sec-
tion, has been implemented with different rules, in order to
control the trust value at each time step ti with respect to dif-
ferent evolved parameters of BIO and TOK. The fuzzy rules
defined for each fuzzy model are reported in Table II.
The Start Trust Model is carried out in order to give a trust-
worthy value depending on biometric and token based accep-
tance rates, acquired from the Strong and Weak authentication
systems. The TRUST value defuzzified is then passed to the
Fuzzy DSS Model, and the final resulting defuzzified trust-
worthy value is used to decide the next steps during the user
permission checks.
VI. PROTOTYPE EVALUATION
The Figure 3 shows the pseudocode of the algorithm imple-
mented in order to test the performance of our approach.
Several experiments have been carried out by considering
different values of BIO and TOK parameters, that result from
the Strong andWeak Authentication Systems, and the informa-
tion about parameter settings and outputs obtained from some
BIO = Biometric User Authentication
TOK = Weak User Authentication
while not not expired time do
TrustA=FuzzyControllerA(BIO,TOK)
Trustworthiness=FuzzyControllerB(TrustA)
if Trustworthiness is very low then
Access Deny
else if Trustness is low then
Matching: new BIO — new TOK
else
Time Control
Biometric User Authentication
end if
end while
Save history of multi-modal authentication process in time
Fig. 3. Pseudocode of the Multi-modal Fuzzy Approach.
TABLE III
EXPERIMENTS TABLE.
Session Id Biometric Ac-
quisition Num-
ber
Password Ac-
quisition Num-
ber
Workin Ses-
sion Time
Id1 1 2 300
Id2 2 2 275
Id3 1 2 300
Id4 1 3 300
Id5 2 2 300
Id6 1 1 183
... ... ... ...
of them are summarized in Table III. The global session time
was fixed in all the simulations to 300 minutes.
Note that in two cases the working session time was less
than the global session time. The Id2 session ended because the
user inserted two consecutive wrong passwords, giving a TOK
value equal to 0. In the other case, Id6 session, the BIO and
TOK values decay to low values: with both values so low, the
overall trustworthiness value become very low and the session
was closed by the system.
The results of two of the experiments carried out are also
shown in Figure 4 and Figure 6. In these figures the curves of
the values acquired by the BIO (dashed line) and TOK (dotted
line) parameters during the entire period of the user connec-
tion are shown, together with the curve of the TRUST values
(solid line) obtained during the period of the right permission
check implemented by the multi-modal fuzzy approach. Figure
5 shows the time curves of the two authentication techniques
(bio and tok) used in the simulation shown in Figure 4. Note
that it is obvious to suppose the weak authentication to decay
faster than the biometric one.
Results show some interesting properties of the security sys-
tem. We describe them on the basis of the simulation shown in
Figure 4:
• the system requires to set the parameter ∆ that regulates
how often the TRUST parameter has to be evaluated. The
value of this parameter is application dependent and ob-
viously depends on the security level we want to obtain.
Simulation results show that it is possible to obtain a good
security (∆ = 1 minute) without interrupting the user
many times and consequently not disturbing her work sig-
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Fig. 4. Simulation of a session closed because TRUST value becomes very
low.
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Fig. 5. Biometric and password time curves used in the simulation shown in
Figure 4
nificantly. Indeed during a working session long about
three hours the user was asked to re-authenticate only
twice: for the first time with the password (after about
1 hour and half from the beginning of the session) and the
second time by the face image (about 2 hours after the be-
ginning of the session). During the image acquisition the
user did not notice to be authenticated and continued to
work;
• the system works well even if context variables (i.e. light-
ing in the room) or biometric acquisitions (due for ex-
ample to the position of the user who continues to work
and does not stay exactly in front of the digital camera)
are not perfect. In the simulation shown in Figure 4 the
first biometric acquisition takes matching score 0,725 due
probably to the not perfect lighting conditions of the room
and the second biometric acquisition takes score 0.4860
due to the not perfect position of the user face. Even with
these drawbacks the system was able to evaluate a trust
level enough high to allow the user to continue to work
undisturbed.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have studied the possibility of using a fuzzy
control system to manage a multi-modal authentication system,
with the aim of checking the identity of a user not only at lo-
gin time but during the entire working session. Our results
show that it is possible to obtain a good level of security dur-
ing the session, without forcing the user to interrupt her work
too many times. Also, the system can be used efficiently even
if the context variables involved in the acquisition are not opti-
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Fig. 6. Simulation of a session closed because the user inserted twice a
wrong password.
mal. Future work will include techniques to prevent biometric
attacks during the overall session time.
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